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1. Introduction
What role do uninsurable entrepreneurial risk and capital market imperfections play in shaping
the wealth distribution in the economy? What are the impacts of nancial development on the
level and volatility of aggregate output and capital? In this paper, we construct a heterogeneous-
agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to address these important macroeconomic
questions quantitatively. The main features of this model are that occupational choice is en-
dogenous, capital markets are incomplete in the sense that idiosyncratic risks cannot be fully
insured, and contracts between borrowers and lenders are imperfectly enforceable.
The literature has typically found that simple models based on standard and identical pref-
erences and on uninsurable shocks to labor income cannot account for the observed U.S. Gini
coe¢ cient of 0:803 on wealth.1 For example, Aiyagari (1994) nds considerably less wealth
concentration in a model with only idiosyncratic labor earnings uncertainty; Krusell and Smith
(1998) nd the same in models with both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Among the innite
horizon models that try to reproduce the wealth distribution in the U.S. data, two kinds of mod-
els have performed well. One is the stochastic- model by Krusell and Smith, which achieves an
improved t in the upper tail of the wealth distribution by assuming that individual discount
factors are idiosyncratic. The second is the model of Castañeda, et al. (2003), which assumes
extremely volatile uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to labor income. Both models achieve their
better ts by introducing individual-specic exogenous disturbances, which arguably weakens
the models as explanations of the wealth distribution.2 The reason that these models do poorly
in explaining the facts is that the only motive to save is precautionary: in order to smooth
consumption, agents build a bu¤er stock of wealth. However, as discussed in the literature on
precautionary savings, once the bu¤er has reached a certain level, the incentive to save becomes
weak. The introduction of life cycle features, as in Huggett (1996), increases the concentration
of wealth as measured by the Gini index. However, the life-cycle model generates this higher
concentration of wealth by increasing the proportion of households with zero or negative wealth,
rather than by generating a higher concentration at the top of the distribution. Therefore, there
must be other mechanisms inducing some agents to accumulate and maintain very high levels
1This number is taken from Budría et al. (2001); the data used are from the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), 1998 wave. Previous estimates using di¤erent waves of the SCF are quite similar to this number.
2For a detailed discussion of the successes and failures of these models in accounting for wealth inequality, see
a survey by Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997).
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of wealth.
Entrepreneurship has been recently used to study household savings, the distribution of
wealth, and social mobility; see Quadrani (2001), Fernández-Villaverde, et al. (2003; henceforth
FGC), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). In the data, entrepreneurs
are a small fraction of the population, but have a high saving rate and hold a large share of
total wealth. For instance, in the 1989 SCF entrepreneurs are 8:7% of the sample, but hold
39% of total net worth. Both Quadrini (2001) and Gentry and Hubbard (2004) document that
the large wealth holdings of entrepreneurs are due not only to the fact that entrepreneurs earn
more income, but also to their saving a larger fraction of their income than non entrepreneurs.
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) is another inuential work. They show that wealthier people are
more inclined to become entrepreneurs because of liquidity constraints: capital is essential for
starting a rm, and liquidity constraints tend to exclude those with insu¢ cient funds at their
disposal. It will be shown that our quantitative results can also conrm their empirical result.
The model in this paper is constructed along the line of heterogeneous-agent models originally
developed by Aiyagari (1994) and is closely related to that studied in FGC (2003). In FGC
(2003), the interest and wage rates are set exogenously in solving individuals optimization
problems; in other words, their model cannot generate the equilibrium interest and wage rates.
In contrast, in this paper, we assume that there are two production sectors (the corporate sector
and the entrepreneur sector) and the interest and wage rates can be determined by the production
of the corporate sector in equilibrium. This novel feature, together with other features such as
uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, occupational choices, and capital market imperfections, makes
our model more di¢ cult to solve because the equilibrium factor prices now depend on both
aggregate capital stock and aggregate labor employment in the corporate sector, which are not
simple functions of a known moment of the distribution, as they depend on the current optimal
decisions of all entrepreneurs and workers. Therefore, we need to add some extra steps to
guarantee that all markets are clear and all households know the current factor prices before
they make decisions.
After calibrating and solving our benchmark model, we nd that the model can generate the
wealth distribution observed in the U.S. data. Furthermore, we show that due to uninsurable
entrepreneurial risks and capital market imperfections, agents choose to save more to undertake
entrepreneurial activity. Finally, we nd that the economy with more volatile entrepreneurial
risks generates greater wealth inequality. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
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characterize the model economy. In Section 3, we characterize householdsoptimization problems
and dene the recursive competitive equilibrium. In Section 4, we set the parameter values and
present main ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model Economy
The model economy is populated by a continuum of innitely lived households measured by 1.
In each period, every household makes a decision to establish or run its own business (be an
entrepreneur) or to be a worker who supplies his or her labor to the competitive labor market.
There are three sectors in the model: the household sector, the production sectors (the corporate
and noncorporate/entrepreneurial sectors), and the nancial intermediation sector. The workers
face partially uninsurable labor income risk, and the entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic uninsurable
entrepreneurial risk. There is one nal good that can be used either for consumption or for
capital services. The timing of the economy is as follows: (i) At the beginning of each period,
di¤erent idiosyncratic shocks are realized; (ii) then, the households will produce according to
their occupational choices made in the previous period to be entrepreneurs or workers; (iii)
next, depending on their present shocks and their access to the credit market, they will decide if
they want to become entrepreneurs or workers in the next period by comparing their conditional
expectations of the next periods value functions; (iv) nally, after production, households decide
how much to save and consume. And all markets clear.
2.1. The Household Sector
Preferences. We consider a model economy with a continuum (with the measure of 1) of ex ante
identical, innitely lived households. Households have standard preferences over consumption
and leisure and maximize the expected lifetime utility as follows:
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu (ct)
#
; (2.1)
where ct is current consumption, u(ct) =
c1 t  1
1  is the standard CRRA utility function (note
that when  = 1; u(ct) = log ct), and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.
Householdseconomic activities. Households are assumed to engage in two economic activ-
ities: production according to their occupational choices and wealth accumulation. Here we
assume that a xed cost to be an entrepreneur (measured in utility units) is a xed number,
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which will be calibrated later, and occupational choices cannot be reverted in the same period.
Idiosyncratic risk to labor productivity and entrepreneurial skills. Following Aiyagari (1994),
we also assume the workers face idiosyncratic shocks to labor e¢ ciency. Each agent is endowed
with one unit of time. This unit of time has stochastic productivity as labor input, "; it can
take a value from 
w = f"1;   ; "ng, where "1 <    < "n. When " = "n; we think of the agent
as having the highest labor productivity, and when " = "1; we think of him or her as having the
lowest labor productivity. The non zero labor services can be used in his or her own business
(to be an entrepreneur) or supplied to the labor market at the competitive wage rate. Following
Quadrini (2001), we also assume that labor has the same productivity in both activities and
supplies all the services of labor in the market.
For comparison with the shocks to labor e¢ ciency, which takes on additive form, we assume
entrepreneurs also face idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risks that take a multiplicative form and
are drawn randomly from the set, 
e = f1; :::; Ng, and similarly we assume that 1 <    < N .
Following FGC (2003), the distribution of these two idiosyncratic shocks depends on the agents
past shocks as well as on occupational choices in the last period: If the agent was an entrepreneur
(a worker) in the last period t  1 and remains an entrepreneur (a worker) in the current period
t; he or she will draw an entrepreneurial shock (a labor productivity shock) from a rst-order
Markov chain P (tjt 1) (Q ("tj"t 1)) dened on 
e (
w); if the agent was an entrepreneur
(a worker) in the last period t   1 and wants to be a worker (an entrepreneur) in the current
period t; he will draw a labor productivity shock (an entrepreneurial shock) from a probability
distribution eQ ("t) ( eP (t)) dened on 
w (
e).
2.2. The Production Sectors
As in Quadrini (2001) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), we have two production sectors: the
corporate sector, composed of large rms and corporations, and the noncorporate sector, com-
posed of entrepreneurs. The two sectors di¤er in their production technologies. Suppose that
entrepreneurship is formed by running business projects, and entrepreneurs face uninsurable en-
trepreneurial risks and nancial constraints. The rst factor causes the whole household wealth
to be invested in the business, and the second one makes the demand for capital of these small
rms closely dependent on the net worth of the owners.
The noncorporate sector/entrepreneur sector
The production function in the entrepreneur sector is
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y = f (; k; l) = kl!; 0 < + ! < 1; (2.2)
where  is the entrepreneurial ability/productivity, i.e., the capacity to invest capital produc-
tively, k the individual entrepreneurial capital, and l the labor input. Entrepreneurs can borrow
and invest capital in a technology whose return depends on their own entrepreneurial ability.
That is, those with higher ability levels have higher average and marginal returns from investing.
The corporate sector
The corporate sector is populated by large rms with a standard Cobb-Douglas technology,
Yc = F (Kc; Lc) = K

c L
1 
c ;
where Kc and Lc are aggregate corporate capital and labor, respectively. In equilibrium, the
interest rate and the wage rate are given by the marginal products of each factor,
W (Kc; Lc) = (1  ) (Kc=Lc) and R(Kc; Lc) =  (Kc=Lc) 1   c; (2.3)
respectively, where c is the rate of depreciation in the corporate sector.
2.3. The Financial Intermediation Sector
The nancial intermediation sector in this model can collect deposits from households by paying
the interest rate R and make loans to either entrepreneurs asking for funds or the corporate
sector. The lending is based on a constant-returns-to-scale technology with a proportional cost
per unit of funds lent. Competition among banks makes (i) intermediation prots zero, (ii) the
lending rates equal to R for loans to the corporate sector, and (iii) Re = R +  for loans to
entrepreneurs; here  is the proportional cost per unit of funds faced by entrepreneurs. Based
on the data about household borrowing and lending to banks and other intermediation sectors
in Quadrani (2001), the lending rate could be set around (0:035; 0:055) :
2.4. Demand for Capital and Business Prots
As a result of borrowing constraints, rms cannot operate at the level that maximizes their
prots. Because household asset holdings, used as collateral, determine the tightness of these
constraints, the demand for capital and labor will depend both on shocks and on the level of
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asset holdings. In case the borrower does not repay the loan with the interest, i.e., in the case
of bankruptcy, the bank gets a share 0 <  < 1 of the prots of the rm. This amount can be
regarded as the quantity that the bank will get if it uses the legal system to enforce the contract.
In addition, the bank cannot seize the households assets. Finally, a default decision today does
not have a reputational consequence in the future. Therefore, the bank will only lend an amount
such that the rm does not have any incentive to default, and this amount may not be the one
needed by the entrepreneur to operate the rm at an optimal level.
At the beginning of the current period, after observing the shocks, the entrepreneur decides
his demand for inputs to maximize his prots:
 (; a) = max
fkt;bt;ltg
fkl!  Wl   (Re + e)bg (2.4)
s.t.: kt  at + bt; (2.5)
(; a)  (1  )(; a) + (1 +Re) b; (2.6)
where at is asset holding, bt is the quantity borrowed from banks, kt is the demand for capital,
and e is the depreciation rate in the entrepreneurial sector. The second equation above is the
incentive compatibility constraint, which implies that the total prot an entrepreneur needs
is higher than the entrepreneurs income if he defaults. Thus, we cannot observe any default
in equilibrium. The rst term on the right-hand side of that equation is the prot that the
household keeps for itself, and the second term is the amount of payments to the nancial
intermediary because of default. Using the same procedure as in FGC (2003),3 we can solve the
above problem and derive the demand for inputs as well as the prot function: k = ke(; a);
l = le(; a); and p = (; a):
3. Household Optimization Problems and Steady State Equilibrium
In this section, we rst present households optimization problems and then dene a steady
state equilibrium for the economy. The optimal occupational choice and decision problem for a
worker can be characterized by the stochastic Bellman equation
3We thank Fernandez-Villaverde for sharing with us his Matlab code for solving the demand functions.
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vw(a; ";  ) = max
c;a0

u(c) + max
Z
vw
 
a0; "0;  0

Q
 
"; d"0

;
Z
ve
 
a0; 0;  0
 eP  d0   (3.1)
s.t. : c+ a0 = [1 +R(Kc; Lc)] a+W (Kc; Lc)

1  eh "
and a0  a; where   denotes the current distribution of agents over asset holdings and idiosyn-
cratic shocks. The worker makes occupational choices by comparing the conditional expecta-
tions of two value functions for being a worker and being an entrepreneur in the next period.
We denote the workers decision rules for consumption and asset holdings as c = cw(a; ") and
a0 = aw(a; "); respectively.
Similarly, the optimization problem of an entrepreneur can be characterized by
ve(a; ;  ) = max
c;a0

u(c) + max
Z
vw
 
a0; "0;  0
 eQ(d"0); Z ve(a0; 0;  0)P (; d0)    (3.2)
s.t. : c+ a0 = (; a) + [1 +R(Kc; Lc)] a+W (Kc; Lc)

1  eh
and a0  a; where we denote the entrepreneurs decision rules for consumption and asset hold-
ings as c = ce (a; ;  ) and a0 = ae (a; ;  ) ; respectively. An entrepreneur will remain an
entrepreneur in the next period if
R
vw (a
0; "0;  0) eQ (d"0) < R ve  a0; 0;  0P  ; d0    ; other-
wise, he will choose to be a worker. Similarly, a worker will remain a worker in the next period
if
R
vw(a
0; "0;  0)Q("; d"0) >
R
ve(a
0; 0;  0) eP (d0)    . Dene i(a; "; ;  ) as the decision rules
governing whether an agent stays in the same occupation; we can use the following indicator
function to specify occupational choices:
i (a; "; ;  ) =
8<: 0; if he stays in the same occupation.1; otherwise, (3.3)
where i = w; e:
Denition A recursive competitive equilibrium for the steady state economy is a set of
decisions rules, cw; ce; aw; ae; k; l, Kc; and Lc, and a set of value functions, vw and ve; the
pricing functions, R and W; and a law of motion for the measure of agents, H, such that:
(1) The decision rules, cw and aw, and value function vw, solve problem (3.1), given the functions
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ve; R; W; and H:
(2) The decision rules, ae; ae; k; l, and value function ve, solve problem (3.2), given the functions
vw; R; W; and H:
(3) The occupational decision rule, i; is determined by (3.3), given vw and ve:
(4) R and W are competitive, i.e., they are equal to the marginal productivity of capital and
labor (net of depreciation) in the corporate sector.
(5) The rmsdecision rules, k and l, solve problem (2.4).
(6) Prices are such that capital and labor markets clear:4
Z
kd e +Kc =
Z
ad  and
Z
ld e + Lc =
Z 
1  eh "d w: (3.4)
(7) The law of motion for the distribution is consistent with individual optimal behavior, and
it is invariant.
Although we cannot guarantee theoretically the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
described above because of the nonconvexity problem in the household problem, practically, the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium does hold in this model because the computational
evidence shows that the value functions in this model are strictly concave for all reasonable
parameter choices. This conclusion, together with the assumptions for stochastic shocks, can
guarantee the existence of the unique invariant measure.
4. Main Findings
4.1. Parameterization
The quantitative properties of the models competitive equilibrium cannot be established an-
alytically, and they need to be studied using numerical methods. Computing the recursive
competitive equilibrium involves three steps. First, we need to impose restrictions on the func-
tional forms. Second, we select as many parameters as possible either by matching long-run
4Note that the left-hand side of the capital market (labor market) equation is the aggregate capital (labor)
demand in the entrepreneur sector and the corporate sector, and the right-hand side is the aggregate capital
(labor) supply from all agents. We also assume here that entrepreneurs do not use their own labor in production
activity.
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properties of the model economy to the U.S. data or by using previous empirical evidence. In
the last step, we need to develop a numerical algorithm to solve the competitive equilibrium up
to an arbitrarily small error. Our computational algorithm is a combination of the ones used
in FGC (2003), Young (2006), and Luo and Young (in press).5 The model period is set to one
year, which is standard in the literature. The discount factor, , is set together with the share of
capital in the entrepreneurial sector, ; so that the capital output ratio of the whole economy in
the steady state is equal to 2:5. We set  = 0:36, which is the standard choice in the literature,
and  = 0:36 and ! = 0:52 so that +$ = 0:88 < 1.6 The implicit degree of decreasing returns
to scale (12%) generates a portion of income earned by entrepreneurs that matches the PSID
data. In our benchmark exercise, we set  = 0. We also choose the parameter  ; which governs
the amount of e¤ort to be an entrepreneur, to be 0:5: In this way, the number of entrepreneurs is
around 8:6%; which matches the number in the U.S. data (SCF and PSID). Table 1 summarizes
our parameter choices for the baseline model.
Next, to parameterize the stochastic idiosyncratic labor productivity, we follow Storesletten,
et al. (2007). They argue that the specication of labor income for an individual household
must allow for persistent and transitory components. Based on their empirical work from the
PSID data, we specify log (yi) to be
log (yi) = !i + i; (4.1)
!0i = !i + v
0
i; (4.2)
where i  N
 
0; 2

is the transitory component and !i is the persistent component. The
innovation term associated with !i is assumed to be distributed as N
 
0; 2v

. They estimate  =
0:935, 2 = 0:01, and 
2
v = 0:061. The unconditional variance of log (yi) is then var [log (yi)] =
2
1 2 + 
2
 = 0:14051. This process attributes about half the unconditional variance to the
persistent component and half to the transitory component. We then approximate this process
with a three-state Markov chain, which is characterized in Table 2.
For the points in ; we follow Quadrini (2001) and FGC (2003). Conditional on 1, 2 and
3 are set to obtain the demand for capital in the medium shock to be 10 times larger than that
5 It is available from the corresponding author by request.
6Note that the production function in the corporate sector is the standard Cobb-Douglas one, whereas the one
in the entrepreneurial sector is strictly decreasing returns to scale.
10
in the low shock and for rms in the high shock to be 100 times larger. Finally, 1 is set to
make the ratio of entrepreneurial wealth to total wealth in the economy match around 0:4. In
Table 3, we choose the diagonal elements in Q to match the empirical exit and entry rates from
entrepreneurship, although we cannot reach the high exit rate as reported in the data, which is
around 24%. In the nondiagonal parts, for the low shocks, we divide the rest of the probability
into two equal numbers, 0:16 each; for the medium shock, we set them to capture the growth
of the rms; for the high shocks, we just assume they drop to the medium level of 10%. The
choice of q =
h
0:6 0:3 0:1
i
is motivated by Quadrini (2001), in which he chooses three bins
that assign 60% of entrepreneurs to small projects, 30% to middle-sized projects, and 10% to
large projects, respectively.
4.2. Baseline Results
As in FGC (2003), our model with endogenously determined interest and wage rates also predicts
that the rms are always constrained in their nancial decisions in the range of asset holdings
where the measure of households is positive. It is obvious that entrepreneurs can borrow more
from outside and operate more protably if their own asset holdings are high. Figure 1 shows
the constrained demand for capital. The di¤erence between the demand for capital and the 45
line is the amount they can borrow from banks. It clearly shows that the higher the wealth
holdings of the entrepreneurs, the higher the capital they demand. That is, they will run larger
projects. Figure 2 shows that the level of prots increases with asset holdings until the rm can
operate at the optimum level.
The value functions for workers and entrepreneurs are plotted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Theoretically, it is obvious that occupational choices of the households may make the value
functions nonconcave, because an individual cannot be half an entrepreneur and half a worker.
However, these two gures show that the value functions for workers and entrepreneurs are both
strictly concave. This nding is robust for any set of our parameter choices, and is consistent
with that obtained in Gomes, et al. (2001) and FGC (2003): Theoretical departures from
concavity are not a serious problem.
Another important question in the literature about entrepreneurship is who prefers to be an
entrepreneur and run his own projects. As in FGC (2003), we also nd that those households
with asset holdings in the middle of the distribution are most likely to become entrepreneurs,
because they can borrow enough capital and run more protable projects, whereas households
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with low asset holdings prefer to be workers because they cannot borrow enough capital due
to the borrowing constraints. In contrast, for households with high levels of asset holdings,
running their own businesses is not very attractive because they can earn enough interest income
from their own assets. Furthermore, our model also predicts that the percentage of workers is
much larger than that of entrepreneurs, and most workers hold assets less than 5; whereas most
entrepreneurs hold asset less than 20. That is, uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and capital market
imperfections make households that want to become entrepreneurs accumulate large wealth.
4.3. Implications of Entrepreneurial Risk on Wealth Inequality and Aggregate Ac-
tivity
Figure 5 clearly shows how our model can generate a skewed wealth distribution. Compared
with the Aiyagari model, our benchmark model can t the data much better. In our model, the
top 1%; 5%, and 10% of agents hold 22%; 49%, and 63% of wealth, respectively; these numbers
are quite similar to those reported from the US data (26%; 47%, and 60%, respectively). As we
discussed above, it is di¢ cult to estimate or calibrate the stochastic process of entrepreneurial
risk because of the lack of good micro data. Therefore, to examine the e¤ects of entrepreneurial
risk on both the wealth distribution and aggregate activity, we assume that the entrepreneurial
risk follows an AR(1) process. Hence, in this section, we just study how the changes in the
volatility of entrepreneurial risk a¤ect the economy instead of trying to match the data perfectly.
Specically, we assume that the entrepreneurial shock follows an AR (1) process,
0i    = e
 
i   

+ i; (4.3)
where  = 1:55, e = 0:65, and i  N

0; 2

.7 We then approximate this process with a
three-state Markov chain as we did before.
Table 4 and Figure 6 provide a summary of the e¤ects of the entrepreneurial risks on aggre-
gate quantities and wealth inequality. The table shows that in the economy with uninsurable en-
trepreneurial risks, both entrepreneurial capital and aggregate capital increase with the volatility
of the entrepreneurial shock because of the precautionary savings motive and borrowing con-
straints. This mechanism of wealth accumulation is similar to the one in the Bewley-Aiyagari
economies. In addition, the equilibrium interest rate is decreasing with 2 as the entrepreneur-
7Changing the values of  and e does not change our main results reported in Table 4.
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ial risk also increases the ratio Kc=Lc. It is shown in a one-sector growth model of Angeletos
and Calvet (2006) that idiosyncratic production shocks introduce a risk premium on private
capital and reduce the demand for investment. Our model tells another story. In our setup,
although the introduction of entrepreneurial risks reduces the demand for the investment in the
entrepreneur sector because of a risk premium on private capital, the e¤ect of the precautionary
savings motive dominates. Therefore, the economy with higher volatility may be characterized
by higher entrepreneurial capital due to the net e¤ect of precautionary savings, a risk premium
of private capital, a lower risk-free rate, and higher aggregate capital due to the reallocation of
capital and labor in the two sectors. Table 4 also shows that the fraction of entrepreneurs in
the economy is increasing with 2 . The intuition is simple: entrepreneurs with higher wealth
levels can borrow more funds and run more protable projects; in this case choosing to be an
entrepreneur becomes more attractive. Furthermore, the economy with high volatility of en-
trepreneurial risks will generate greater wealth inequalities. Figure 6 plots the Lorenz curves
for di¤erent volatilities. Our models prediction is very intuitive: for the economy with high
volatility, the entrepreneurs hit by a sequence of good shocks will become wealthier and those
hit by a sequence of bad shocks will keep losing and then have to close their own businesses and
become workers.
4.4. E¤ects of Imperfect Enforcements
In this section, we examine the impacts of contract enforcements on the economy by adjusting
the appropriability factor . This factor may also be a measure of the degree of nancial
development in the equilibrium. Based on the number reported by Moddys investorsservice,
we set  = 0:4, 0:6, and 0:8, respectively. All other parameters are the same as those used in the
baseline model. Table 5 summarizes the main e¤ects of ; i.e., the tightness of the borrowing
constraints, on aggregate quantities and cross-sectional properties. This table shows that, when
 increases, i.e., the borrowing constraints become tight, both K and Ke go up. The intuition
behind this result is simple: in the economy with a high appropriability factor, in equilibrium,
where no default is observed, entrepreneurs could borrow more capital and employ more labor,
and then run more protable projects and produce more output in the entrepreneurial sector:
Furthermore, more workers with higher levels of asset holdings would choose to be entrepreneurs.
This e¤ect can slightly reduce the wealth inequalities in the economy because more people
become entrepreneurs, and more entrepreneurs become even richer.
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5. Conclusions
This paper presents and solves a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model with occupa-
tional choices, uninsurable idiosyncratic labor and entrepreneurial risks, and incomplete markets
including both the absence of a state contingent market for idiosyncratic risks and credit market
imperfections. We demonstrate in this model that introducing entrepreneurial risks and capital
market imperfections can substantially increase the wealth inequalities and thus provide a bet-
ter match with the U.S. data. We also demonstrate that uninsurable entrepreneurial risk can
increase aggregate entrepreneurial capital stock because of precautionary motives and borrowing
constraints.
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Table 1. Parameter choices
     !   
0:9 1 0:36 0:06 0:36 0:52 0 0:5
Table 2. Idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity
" =
h
0:57 0:93 1:51
i
; P =
26664
0:75 0:24 0:01
0:19 0:62 0:19
0:01 0:24 0:75
37775 ; p = h 0:31 0:38 0:31 i
Table 3. Idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurial activity
 =
h
1 1:26 1:68
i
; Q =
26664
0:68 0:16 0:16
0:1 0:7 0:2
0:0 0:1 0:9
37775 ; q = h 0:6 0:3 0:1 i
Table 4. The aggregate e¤ects of uninsurable entrepreneurial risks
 K Ke Kc=Lc Ye Yc # of entrep. R W
0:14 1:380 0:176 4:225 0:117 0:482 6:0% 0:087 1:075
0:16 1:554 0:304 5:169 0:207 0:441 9:6% 0:069 1:157
0:18 1:688 0:642 10:684 0:454 0:233 17:8% 0:021 1:511
Table 5. The aggregate e¤ects of contract enforcements
 K Ke Kc=Lc Ye Yc # of entrep. R Gini
0:4 1:912 0:820 7:690 0:422 0:300 8:23% 0:039 0:638
0:6 1:961 0:932 8:366 0:473 0:268 9:53% 0:035 0:635
0:8 1:973 1:023 8:716 0:512 0:240 10:3% 0:033 0:627
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Figure 1. The demand for capital. Figure 2. The prots.
Figure 3. Workers value function. Figure 4. Entrepreneurs value function.
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Figure 5. The Lorenz curves for wealth.
Figure 6. The Lorenz curves for wealth.
19
